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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we deal with some pieces of evidence that are 
necessary to explain the paradox of rapid GDP growth despite the 
dismal competitiveness of the Greek economy during 1995-2008. It is 
shown how the structural weaknesses of the Greek economy have hit 
the domestic economy investigating their impact on the current 
turmoil. It is argued that the previously favourable global economic 
environment acted as a locomotive to domestic growth, whereas now 
that it is gone, structural problems of poor governance, low 
competitiveness, and a ballooning public deficit and debt have come 
to the surface. We offer a specific explanation of the current 
unfortunate state of the economy briefly considering avenues of 
necessary reforms to overcome it. 
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The Greek Paradox of Falling Competitiveness and Weak 
Institutions in a High GDP Growth Rate Context (1995-2008) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the mid 1990s, Greece’s economy enjoyed an average growth rate of 4% 
(Figure 1), which let the country converge, more or less, with the Eurozone 
standards of living. Despite that, many structural weaknesses continued to 
prevail, if not deteriorate. During the last 15 years or so, Greece substantially 
succeeded in improving the ‘private standard of living’, but remained behind in 
the organization of its society, economic institutions and provision of public 
goods to the citizens. As a result, when the global economic crisis hit, all the 
mess behind the glittering and superficial ‘nominal growth’ came to the 
surface. 
To find a way out of this mess we need first to understand the basic flaws of the 
Greek economy, the distortions, injustices, perverse institutional incentives that 
dominate today our economy. Then we will be able to find out the crucial link, 
the link of cardinal importance that could bring a wave and a domino of 
progressive structural reforms. 
In this context, section 2 presents and analyzes the engines of high growth rates 
that the Greek economy experienced during 1995-2008. Section 3 focuses on 
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the facets of low competitiveness, while section 4 deals with the facets and 
evidence of institutional weakness and poor governance. Section 5 investigates 
the paradox of the underlying ‘high labour productivity’ in a low 
competitiveness context, and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The engines of growth, 1995-2008 
Certain positive developments led to the strong growth performance observed 
in Greece since the mid-90s and up to 2008. Figure 1 shows how Greece 
clearly outperformed, since 1995-96, the benchmark Eurozone economy. 
However, it is absolutely crucial to look at the factors of ‘growth’ to see why -
at least in the greater part- this performance was superficial and fragile; i.e. not 
based on the improvement, the deepening, or the expansion of domestic 
production. 
Figure 1 
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These developments include, primarily, the proper liberalization of the credit 
markets at the beginning of the 1990’s, completed by the end of the 1990’s. 
This was coupled with entry to the Economic and Monetary Union. These two 
developments combined led simultaneously to macroeconomic stabilization 
and a steady increase of private credit after 2000. It should be stressed that the 
expansion of private credit replaced, since the early 1990s, the government 
deficit spending as the main way to finance the expansion of consumption in 
Greece (although data should be treated with caution). It is most likely, that 
fiscal expansion reinforced private credit and the expansion of private 
consumption. Figure 2 shows the demand injections to Greek GDP. 
Figure 2 
Demand injections. Greece.
 Data sources: Bank of Greece, Ministry of Finance, European 
Commission, EUROSTAT.
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Source: Bank of Greece, Ministry of Finance, European Commission Budget and 
EUROSTAT. 
 
The impact of these injections was significant as a percentage of GDP for every 
year during the prolonged period of Greece’s strong performance. 
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Additionally, the rapid fall of interbank rates after 1998 (Figure 3) shows the 
significant contribution of the stabilization of the macroeconomic outlook of 
Greece. This stabilization took place in the run up to EMU accession and 
allowed the expansion of private credit. 
Figure 3 
 
The fall of interbank rates also reflects the decline in the rates offered by 
commercial banks to households and businesses (bringing also a significant fall 
of the inflation differential of Greece with respect to the euro zone average). 
The expansion of credit to households fuelled the growth of private 
consumption during the past years (as clearly shown in Figure 4). Only during 
the period preceding the completion of the infrastructure projects (for the 2004 
Olympic Games), private consumption kept accelerating in spite of a lull in the 
explosive growth of private sector credit. But this exception is easily explained 
by the peak in the investment growth rate during that time (figure 5). 
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Figure 4 
 
Figure 5 
 
Besides the credit expansion, two other factors contributed significantly to 
Greece’s growth performance during the 2000s. First, the shipping and tourism 
sectors secured significant annual revenue inflows of about 25% of GDP that 
were added to the domestic demand and helped mitigate the huge trade balance 
deficit. Second, the fiscal stimulus given by the 2004 Olympic Games was 
nourished through public borrowing and led to the improvement of certain key 
infrastructure facilities. 
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Figure 6 
 
The rapid increase of new investment, both public and private (Figure 6), also 
demonstrates the impact of the infrastructure investment that was largely 
financed by EU structural funds. Still, the rush into EU-financed infrastructure 
investment did not only contribute to investments and consequently to the 
creation of new jobs. Many of these projects, when finished, actively boosted 
the productivity in the area surrounding Athens. In other words, the inflow of 
funds from the European Union, in the framework of EU Structural Funds and 
Common Agricultural Policy, also contributed largely to the improvement of 
key productivity enhancing infrastructure facilities. 
Last but not least, the improvement in the regulation of certain product markets 
(Figure 7) contributed to accelerated economic growth. Regulation was reduced 
from a very high level, even though it still remains very high compared to other 
OECD countries according to Conway and Nicoletti (2006) (see graphs/figures 
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performance during the 2000s. This improvement included mainly the 
liberalization of the telecommunications market at the beginning of the 1990’s 
and to a lesser extent to the liberalization of the transportation and energy 
sectors. 
Figure 7   
 
 
3. The four facets of low competitiveness 
At the same time, a wide range of factors contributed towards the persistently 
poor performance in the competitiveness of the Greek economy, which is 
documented by numerous databases and surveys by international organizations 
and researchers. These factors include: (i) the persistent current account deficit 
in double-digit numbers (as a % of GDP), (ii) the positive differential with the 
euro zone average inflation, and (iii) the unattractiveness of Greece to foreign 
direct investments that are practically zero (inflows minus outflows). Research 
by OECD and the World Bank indicate that the various institutional 
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weaknesses that prevail in Greece account for this dismal competitiveness 
performance.  
Starting with the inflation differential of Greece with the Euro-zone (Figure 8), 
it could be explained with the Balassa-Samuelson effect stemming from the 
rapid growth rate of the country. However, the differential seems to emerge 
both in the goods (tradable) and services (non-tradable) sectors sub-indexes, 
something that initially seems to refute the Balassa-Samuelson argument.1  
Figure 8 
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A comparison with Ireland is most revealing. The inflation of goods in Ireland 
is much lower than the inflation of services, and that emerges as a textbook 
Balassa-Samuelson case. Therefore, the high Greek inflation seems to emerge 
as a result of the demand increase. The latter is largely driven by the expansion 
of credit, the inflows from the EU-structural funds, the inflows from tourism 
and shipping industry, and public borrowing. This increase is not matched by a 
similar increase in the domestic supply of goods and services. In the case of 
                                                 
1
 Although to a certain extent, tourism that constitutes a significant part of services, should be 
considered also as a ‘tradable service’.  
  9 
Ireland, the surplus of the goods balance seems to finance a deficit in the 
services balance, following a pattern that fits the standard predictions of the 
Balassa-Samuelson model. 
The second piece of evidence that supports this argument is the excessive –and 
increasing- deficit of the goods trade balance, as a percentage of GDP (Figure 
9). As a matter of fact, the deficit is of such a magnitude that has never been 
observed in any country without severe repercussions. In the case of Greece, 
participation to the Euro-zone seems to have averted developments like the 
entrance into a spiral of high inflation and currency devaluations. As a result, 
the trade deficit in Greece can clearly demonstrate the existence of a serious 
discrepancy between the growth of domestic demand and the increase of the 
domestic supply of both goods and services. It should be stressed that in the 
case of non-tradable services, the inflation differential is sufficient to document 
the discrepancy between supply and demand, but the emergence of such a 
differential for goods as well suggests the peculiarity of the Greek case. 
Therefore, the evidence at hand would make it more appropriate to label 
Greece as a unique case of ‘quasi Balassa-Samuelson’, where exports are 
replaced by EU-transfers and domestic credit expansion, and the price level is 
pushed upwards both in the goods and the services sector in line with similar 
arguments presented elsewhere (Gibson 2007; Pelagidis and Toay, 2007). The 
increase of the goods deficit follows as a natural consequence in this case, as 
increases in demand are satisfied by competitive and available imported goods 
  10 
as there is no sufficient domestic supply of goods that can compete with the 
imports. 
Figure 9 
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This persistent deterioration of the goods balance has been financed (besides 
from the surplus of the services account) through foreign inflows in both Greek 
government bonds as well as into the stocks of Greek companies -until the 
recent financial turmoil. However, it should be noted, rarely were these inflows 
of the FDI type. FDIs during the last three years were close to zero ($0,9 bil. 
for 2006, $-2,5 bil. for 2007 and $1.3 bil. for 2008, according to the Bank of 
Greece). In fact, FDI inward flows for Greece as a percentage of GDP are very 
low for almost all years, something that is in line with the link between the 
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attractiveness of the business environment and FDI as described by authors 
such as Hajkova et al (2007). 
The performance of the goods balance together with the inflation differential 
with the euro zone for tradable goods suggests that the cost of importing and 
distributing these competitive imported goods is higher compared to the Euro-
zone. Furthermore, it suggests that the imports remain competitive in the 
domestic market in spite of this high cost of importing and distributing, which 
seems to be really damning for the competitiveness of the domestic supply of 
goods. 
In spite of the mitigating effect of the surplus of the services balance, which is 
mainly driven by the performance of the shipping industry and tourism, the 
current account balance has remained for many years at a level (15% to GDP), 
that in any other country would have been associated with serious 
repercussions. It should be noted, that the two sectors that contribute to the 
services account surplus are less affected by the regulatory environment of the 
Greek economy. For the case of shipping, it operates almost completely outside 
the Greek jurisdiction and administrative reality, while for the case of tourism, 
it draws its competitive strength largely from the geographical attractiveness 
and cultural heritage of Greece. 
These pieces of evidence manifest themselves in the compelling case for the 
low competitiveness of the Greek economy, documented by a number of 
surveys (Table 10). Interestingly, a wide selection of different surveys -
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including those that measure governance and corruption- rank Greece in a 
roughly similar way, even though they often use different methods; either 
evaluation of hard evidence or responses to questionnaires (or both). 
Figure 10: Competitiveness indexes 
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Iceland 11 UK 12 Luxembourg 11 UK 17
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Belgium 19 France 16 Germany 14 Belgium 22
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France 31 Chile 28 France 24 New Zealand 37
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Greece 96 Romania 68 …… Venezuela 74
Dom inican 
Republic 97 ……. Sudan 175 ….
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Cen tral African 
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4. Facets and evidence of institutional weakness and poor governance 
The OECD Regulation Database, the World Economic Forum competitiveness 
survey, the World Bank “Doing Business” and Governance Indicators and 
European Commission estimates (EC, 2006; EU 2002), to name a few, all reach 
similar conclusions. Indicatively, they find that in Greece the administrative 
burden is exceptionally high (Figure 11), that regulation of markets is 
excessive, that government intervention limits competition as well as resource 
allocation and pricing decisions in crucial network industries, that the 
regulation of professional services (Figure 12) is high as far as entry and price 
setting is concerned. At the same time, qualitative standards are excessively lax 
(Paterson et al. 2003), and the business environment on the whole is 
unattractive. 
Figure 11 
 
 
 
These findings are complemented by more general statements that indicate 
weak institutions, poor governance (Kaufmann et al, 2005), while high levels 
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of corruption seem to be a result of the high administrative burden and the poor 
governance (Ackerman, 2006). 
As a matter of fact, the magnitude of the weaknesses documented above 
matches the size of the competitiveness deficit documented for Greece in the 
previous section. Not surprisingly, Greece is found to be the OECD country 
which has the most to gain in terms of productivity from rectifying deficiencies 
like product market regulation (Conway, et al. 2006). The Greek 
competitiveness can be labeled “dismal” not because of its absolute level, but 
because of the large discrepancy between those weaknesses and the per capita 
GDP rates achieved in the past. In particular, following the strong performance 
till the 70’s and the strong performance of the past years, per capita GDP is 
relatively closer to that of other OECD and EU member countries.  
Figure 12  
 
Source: OECD indicator for regulation in professional services, 2007. 
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While Greece remains among the poorer members of these groups, it still can 
distance itself clearly from countries not participating in these organizations. 
On the other hand, all the other performance indicators are clearly much 
weaker than the performance of many OECD and EU member-states. Greece is 
clearly placed in the middle of the global rankings, and not in the top 20% of 
the world, as is the case with per capita GDP. In sum, Greece emerges as a 
country with almost first-class GDP per capita GDP, but second-class in terms 
of governance, institutions, business environment, and corruption (Figure 13).  
Figure 13 
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The factors analyzed in the second section, document why Greece grew so fast 
in spite of the governance and institutional shortcomings. This discussion is in 
line with the extended literature, mainly of OECD Economic Department 
Working Papers2, that directly link the performance of an economy with the 
                                                 
2
 An indicative selection of related OECD and non-OECD related publications is: OECD (2007a); 
Conway et al, (2006); Bassanini et al, (2006); Nicoletti et al, (2005); Nicoletti et al, (2006); Conway et 
al, (2005); Bassanini et al, (2002); Scarpetta et al, (2002); Scarpetta, et al, (2002); Nicoletti et al, 
(2003); OECD (2003); Alesina et al, (2003); Nicoletti et al, (2001); Conway et al, (2006).  
  16 
quality of the regulatory framework and the prevalence of competitive markets. 
In a similar way one can reconcile also almost all of the other weak 
performances of the country, that range form research and innovation 
(Bassanini et al, 2000) to the protection of the environment, the quality of 
public health services, and performance of schools and higher education system 
(Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2001; Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis, 2007; OECD, 
2007b). Even the weak performance of the judiciary can be ultimately linked to 
this pattern (Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis, 2007; Djankov et al, 2002). 
 
5. A note on the labor factor of production. The paradox of the 
underlying ‘high labour productivity’ in a low competitiveness 
context 
The result of the strong demand growth -that is not driven by an increase in 
domestic supply that follows from an increase in employment- (Figure 14), 
directly affects the reliability of productivity indices that measure GDP to 
labour input in various forms (giving around 2.5-3% for Greece during these 
years). This is the result of an increase in the numerator (GDP), matching a 
restrained increase in the denominator (as can be seen in Figure 14), thus 
measuring a large increase in the productivity per worker or per hour worked. 
This large increase is observed in spite of the dismal performance of the Greek 
economy as measured by the rigidity index of product markets (Fig.15). 
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Figure 14 
Employment ratio for the population over 15 years of age.
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Figure 15 
 
Source: Conway et al (2006). Note: 0=less regulated. 6=more regulated, rigid. 
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It follows from the above analysis that the use of such indicators is not fully 
capturing the variety of the parameters that shape the performance of the Greek 
economy during the past decade, and they often depict Greece in a position that 
doesn’t favour the drawing of reliable conclusions. This gives also an 
explanation to the puzzle of having on the one side high GDP and productivity 
rates, and on the other side low competitiveness with twin deficits. At least to 
the extent that we take into account only domestic forces without taking into 
account factors such as euro’s overvaluation3 and the asymmetric demand 
shocks. 
Therefore, it is worth looking more on some other aspects of institutional 
rigidities which complement very well low competitiveness. In particular, 
Figure 16 summarizes the product market regulation, including private 
governance and product market competition such as state-control and legal 
barriers to entry in a competitive market. Greece, after Poland and Hungary, 
has the most regulated product market, with harmful microeconomic effects 
such as price distortion and an unfortunate low usage of labour. 
                                                 
3
 At least to the extent that Greece’s trade take place with outside EU partners (around 50% of total).  
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Figure 16  Product market regulation. Degree of restrictiveness of regulation 
having an impact on economic behaviour 
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Additionally, Figure 17 concerns the state involvement in business operations 
via price controls or the use of command and control regulation. ‘Command 
and control’ includes a lot of administrative mechanisms to hinder 
entrepreneurial activity/organization, in sectors such as ‘road and railway 
transports’ and retail trade. 
Figure 17 Restrictiveness of regulatory burden on business procedures 
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Note: 0=less regulated. 6=more regulated, rigid.  
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Product markets rigidities are of critical importance for rigidities in the labour 
markets as well. Figure 18 shows Greece among OECD countries with the 
highest employment protection legislation (EPL). It should be noted that the 
market for non-permanent, temporary employment in Greece is the main reason 
for the exceptional rigidity of the Greek labour market overall, but also the 
market for permanent contracts is relatively rigid when compared with other 
OECD countries. 
Figure 18: Employment Protection Legislation. 
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These kind of structural institutional rigidities constitute a true cost to society 
in the environment of a non-competitive economy like the Greek. It leads to the 
exclusion of many others from the labor market, and especially the young that 
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seek salaried labor. Youth unemployment (under 26 years old) is more than 
35% and 20% for women and men correspondingly today. This should be read 
as underutilization of a dynamic labor force, and should not be considered 
solely as a major social or ethical issue. Also, one should be right to suppose 
that the riots of December 2008 had their roots on the marginalization of huge 
masses of unemployed young people. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have started out with a brief description and analysis of the 
prosperous years and at the same time of the falling competitiveness of 
Greece’s economy. We have shown that -paradoxically at first sight- high GDP 
growth rates can very well co-exist with falling competitiveness and continued 
institutional weakness. We have traced an idiosyncratic disease; that is, 
massive ‘inflows’ (tourism, structural funds, shipping, public borrowing) that 
fueled GDP growth rate, but left the real economy and economic institutions 
with obsolete and rigid structures. 
We looked at extensive regulation of markets, high administrative costs, a 
business environment that is not favorable to entrepreneurship and, in the end, 
weak convergence and widespread corruption as drivers and causes of this low 
competitiveness. In spite of the reforms in the credit and telecommunications 
markets and the benefits accruing from EMU accession, these weaknesses 
persist. Therefore, Greece seems to have benefited from certain reforms in 
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terms of potential output, while it retained other weaknesses that undermine the 
long-term growth potential of the country. These weaknesses are ultimately 
described as rigidities, weak non-independent institutions and governance. 
Their proliferation is deeply built in the equilibrium that is formed today 
between the interest groups that accrue the rents through the regulation of 
markets and the inflation of the administrative costs (Pelagidis and 
Mitsopoulos, 2009). One could also argue that the strong growth of the past 
years has also made the need for further reforms less pressing. 
The stakes are the long term growth prospects of the Greek economy, once the 
impact of the reforms of the EU and EMU membership peter out, and what is 
needed is the relocation towards a new equilibrium in which rents that are 
accrued from –and through- state intervention and high administrative costs are 
replaced with profits that accrue from competitive, transparent, well-regulated 
markets. Instead of an income distribution on the basis of the ability to secure 
favors from the executive and legislature, income should be generated from 
innovation-driven entrepreneurship in competitive markets.  
The current situation requires for a group of reform-minded politicians that will 
not yield to the pressures of the interest groups and will have sufficient 
knowledge to use the powers of the government, in spite of the fact that the 
administration is a weak tool for policy implementation. They will have to 
significantly change the “rules of the game” by setting the legislative 
framework for free and competitive markets across the board. This effort must 
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also be complemented with the establishment of sufficient checks and balances 
and the setting of the legal basis for the widespread establishment of 
transparency and accountability in all levels of the government and 
administration, which are also topics for a further research. 
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